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J.A. Gray’s Reinforcement
Sensitivity Theory (RST) 
of Personality
Alan Pickering and Philip Corr
Jeffrey Gray’s (1976, 1982) behavioural 
inhibition system (BIS) theory of anxiety has
stood well the test of time. This theory of
personality – which is now widely known as
reinforcement sensitivity theory (RST) – has
gradually evolved over the past 30 years,
seeing its major revision in 2000 by Gray and
McNaughton, and even further elaborations
and refinements subsequently (McNaughton
and Corr, 2004, 2008; Corr and McNaughton,
2008). However, recent data that have
strengthened the general foundations of the
neural basis of the theory have also forced
significant modifications of, and additions to,
its superstructure. These changes are not
inconsequential; as such, predictions cannot
now be based on prior knowledge of the 1982
version. These changes, we contend, have the
potential to lead to confusion. A major 
purpose of this chapter is to review the current
scientific status of Gray’s RST and draw out
some of its major implications for future
research.
RST is built upon a state description of
neural systems and associated, relatively
short-term, emotions and behaviours, which,
according to the theory, give rise to longer-
term trait dispositions of emotion and 
behaviour. This theory argues that statistically
defined personality factors are sources of
variation that are stable over time and 
that derive from underlying properties of an
individual; it is these, and current changes in
the environment, that comprise the neuropsy-
chological foundations of ‘personality’. This
assertion is demanded by the fact that 
personality traits account for behavioural 
differences between individuals presented
with identical environments; also, behavioural
differences show consistency across time.
Thus, the ultimate goal of personality
research is to identify the relatively static
(underlying) biological variables that determine
the (superficial) factor structure measured in
behaviour. It would, of course, be a mistake
to deny the relevance of the environment in
controlling behaviour, but to produce consis-
tent long-term effects, environmental influ-
ences must be mediated by, and instantiated
in, biological systems.
11
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Gray’s approach to the biological basis 
of personality followed a particular pattern:
(a) first identify the fundamental properties
of brain-behavioural systems that might be
involved in the important sources of variation
observed in human behaviour and (b) then
relate variations in these systems to known
measures of personality. Central to this
approach is the assumption that the variation
observed in the functioning of these brain-
behavioural systems comprise what we term
‘personality’. As discussed below, relating
(a) to (b) has proved the major challenge to
RST researchers.
Now, most RST studies have tested the
unrevised (pre-2000) version of RST. But, as
we shall see, in many crucial respects, the
revised Gray and NcNaughton (2000) theory
of the underlying neural systems and their
function is very different, leading to the for-
mulation of new personality hypotheses,
some of which stand in opposition to those
generated from the unrevised theory (for more
detailed discussion of these matters, see Corr,
2004, 2008; Corr and McNaughton, 2008;
McNaughton and Corr, 2004, 2008).
‘CLASSIC’ (1970–2000) AND 
REVISED (2000–) REINFORCEMENT
SENSITIVITY THEORY
Today, in personality research, it is common
to relate personality factors to emotion and
motivational systems, but this consensus did
not prevail before the time of Gray’s original
work. It is a mark of achievement that Gray’s
(1970, 1982) approach is today so widely
accepted, and the emergence of a neuro-
science of personality can be seen to be
largely shaped by his work. In a similar vein
to Hans Eysenck’s (1957, 1967) theories
before him, Gray’s innovation was to put
together the existing pieces of the scientific
jigsaw in order to provide the foundations 
of a general theory of personality. Gray, 
like Pavlov (1927) before him, advocated a
twin-track approach: the conceptual nervous
system (cns), and the central nervous system
(CNS) (cf. Hebb, 1955). That is, the cns
components of personality (e.g. learning
theory; see Gray, 1975) and the component
brain systems underlying systematic varia-
tions in behaviour (ex hypothesi, personal-
ity). As noted by Gray (1972a), these two
levels of explanation must be compatible, but
given a state of imperfect knowledge it
would be unwise to abandon one approach in
favour of the other. Gray used the language
of cybernetics, in the form of cns–CNS
bridge, to show how the flow of information
and control of outputs is achieved (e.g. the
Gray and Smith, 1969, ‘arousal-decision’
model).
Theoretical origins of RST
In contrast to Gray’s bottom-up general
approach, Hans Eysenck adopted a very 
different ‘top-down’ method. His search for
causal systems was determined by the 
structure of statistically derived personality
factors/dimensions. In an important respect,
Eysenck’s approach was viable: this was to
understand the causal bases of observed
personality structure, defined as a unitary
whole (e.g. extraversion and neuroticism).
For this very reason, it is perhaps not surpris-
ing to learn that Eysenck’s causal systems
never developed beyond the postulation of a
small number of very general brain
processes, principally the ascending reticular
activating system (ARAS), underlying the
dimension of introversion–extraversion and
cortical arousal (for a summary see Corr,
2004). A second dimension, neuroticism (N),
was related to activation of the limbic system
and emotional instability (see Eysenck and
Eysenck, 1985). Taken together, Gray’s and
Eysenck’s approaches are complementary,
tackling important problems at different
levels of analysis.
Eysenck’s (1967) arousal theory of extra-
version hypothesized that introverts and
extraverts differ with respect to the sensitivity
of their cortical arousal system; and this is in
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consequence of differences in response
thresholds of their ARAS. According to this
theory, compared with extraverts, introverts
have lower response thresholds and thus
higher cortical arousal. In general, introverts
were said to be more cortically aroused and
more arousable when faced with sensory
stimulation. However, the extraversion-
arousal champions marched under a banner
upon which was blazoned an inverted-U
symbol – chosen, in large measure, by virtue
of the Pavlovian notion of transmarginal
inhibition (TMI; a protective mechanism that
breaks the link between increasing stimuli
intensity and behaviour at high intensity
levels – in the Hullian learning literature 
this effect went under the name of ‘stimulus
intensity dynamism’). It was against this 
theoretical backdrop that RST developed.
Gray’s (1970, 1972b, 1981) modification
of Eysenck’s theory proposed changes: (a) to
the position of extraversion (E) and neuroticism
(N) in Eysenckian factor space; and (b) to
their neuropsychological bases. Gray argued
that E and N should be rotated by approxi-
mately 30 degrees to form the more causally
efficient axes of ‘punishment sensitivity’,
reflecting anxiety (Anx), and ‘reward 
sensitivity’, reflecting impulsivity (Imp)
(Figure 11.1; see Pickering et al., 1999).
This modification stated that Imp+ indi-
viduals are more sensitive to signals of
reward, relative to Imp− individuals, and
Anx+ individuals are more sensitive to 
signals of punishment, relative to Anx− indi-
viduals. The proposed independence of the
axes suggested that (a) responses to reward
should be the same at all levels of Anx and
(b) responses to punishment should be the
same at all levels of Imp – this position was
dubbed the ‘separable subsystems hypothesis’
by Corr (2001, 2002). According to RST,
Eysenck’s E and N dimensions are derivative
secondary factors of these more fundamental
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ExtraversionIntroversion
Neuroticism
Stability
BAS
REW: Reward sensitivity
‘impulsivity’
FFFS(BIS)
PUN: Punishment sensitivity
‘anxiety’
Figure 11.1 Position in factor space of the fundamental punishment sensitivity and reward
sensitivity (unbroken lines) and the emergent surface expressions of these sensitivities, viz.
extraversion (E) and neuroticism (N) (broken lines). The current working hypothesis is that
‘punishment sensitivity’ – which, in the unrevised model, was labelled ‘anxiety – relates 
to both the FFFS and BIS’
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punishment and reward sensitivities: E reflects
the balance of punishment and reward 
sensitivities; N reflects their joint strengths
(Gray, 1981).
Clinical neurosis
Eysenck’s taxonomic model of personality
was based on the factor analysis of the 
symptoms of war ‘neurotics’ (1944, 1947),
and his 1957 and 1967 causal theories were
designed to explain the genesis of these 
neuroses; it is, thus, on these grounds that 
the theory is critically tested. In brief,
Eysenck postulated that introverts are more
prone to suffer from anxiety disorders by
virtue of their greater conditionability, 
especially of emotional responses. This
theory was later elaborated to include the
notion of incubation effects in conditioning
(Eysenck, 1979), in order to account for 
the ‘neurotic paradox’ (i.e. the failure of
extinction with continued non-reinforcement
of the CS). Coupled with emotional instability,
reflected in N, this made the introverted 
neurotic (E−/N+) particularly prone to 
anxiety disorders.
However, from the very beginning of this
arousal-based theory of personality, a
number of problems refused to be silenced.
For one, introverts show weaker classical
conditioning under conditions conducive to
high arousal (which, we must assume, is also
induced by aversive UCSs), as seen in 
eyeblink conditioning studies (Eysenck 
and Levey, 1967). This finding supports
Eysenck’s own theory that introverts are
transmarginally inhibited by high arousal,
but at the very same moment fails to explain
adequately the genesis of clinical neurosis.
Other problems also screamed out to be
heard. For example, impulsivity (inclined
into the N plane; see Figure 11.1), not socia-
bility (defining the extraversion axis), is
often found to be associated with condition-
ing effects (Eysenck and Levey, 1972), but
this places high arousability, and thus high 
conditionability, along an axis that is 
orthogonal to the one which has its high 
pole in the neurotic-introvert quadrant 
where clinical neurosis is located. Thus,
Eysenck’s own theory seems unable to
explain the development of anxiety in neu-
rotic-introverts. Time-of-day effects further 
undermine the central postulates of
Eysenck’s personality theory of clinical 
neurosis (see Gray, 1981).
In addition to the above problems, Gray
cited a further reason to prefer a non-
conditioning explanation (Corr, 2008). Now,
classical conditioning theory states that as 
a result of the conditioned stimulus (CS) 
and unconditioned stimulus (UCS) being
systematically paired, the CS comes to take
on many of the eliciting properties of the
UCS. That is, when presented alone after
conditioning, the CS produces a response
(i.e. the conditioned response, CR) that
resembles the unconditioned response
(UCR) elicited by the UCS. However, the CR
does not substitute for the UCR – in several
important respects, the CR does not even
resemble the UCR. For example, a pain 
UCS will elicit a wide variety of reactions
(e.g. vocalization and behavioural excite-
ment) which are quite different to those
elicited by a CS signalling pain, which con-
sists of a quite different set of behaviours
(e.g. quietness and behavioural inhibition).
We thus have a theory that does not seem fit
for purpose: classical conditioning cannot
explain the pathogenesis or phenomenology
of neurosis, although it can explain how 
initially neutral stimuli (CSs) acquire the
motivational power to elicit this state. Gray
asked the crucial question: if classical 
conditioning does not account for the gener-
ation of the negative emotional state that
characterises neurosis, then what does? His
answer – based upon extensive animal
research (e.g. behavioural, pharmacological,
lesion, and electrical stimulation studies) –
was an innate mechanism, namely the 
behavioural inhibition system (BIS; Gray,
1976, 1982).
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Three systems of ‘classic’ RST
RST gradually developed over the years to
include three major systems of emotion:
1 The behavioural inhibition system (BIS) was 
postulated to be sensitive to conditioned aversive
stimuli (i.e. signals of both punishment and 
the omission/termination of reward) relating to
Anx, but also to extreme novelty, high-intensity
stimuli, and innate fear stimuli (e.g. snakes, blood),
which are more related to fear.
In addition, two other systems were 
postulated:
2 The fight / flight system (FFS) was postulated to 
be sensitive to unconditioned aversive stimuli 
(i.e. innately painful stimuli), mediating the emo-
tions of rage and panic. This system was related
to the state of negative affect (NA) (associated
with pain) and speculatively associated by Gray
with Eysenck’s trait of psychoticism.
3 The behavioural approach system (BAS) was 
postulated to be sensitive to conditioned appetitive
stimuli, forming a positive feedback loop, activated
by the presentation of stimuli associated with
reward and the termination/omission of signals
of punishment. This system was related to the
state of positive affect (PA) and the trait of Imp.
The BIS was modelled on the detailed pattern
of behavioural effects of classes of drugs
known to affect anxiety in human beings. By
this route, Gray argued, anxiety could be
operationally specified as those behaviours
changed by anxiolytic drugs. Of course, there
exists here the danger of circularity of 
argument; this was avoided by the postula-
tion that anxiolytic drugs do not simply
reduce anxiety (itself a vacuous tautology),
but could be shown to have a number of
behavioural effects in typical animal learning
paradigms. Experimental evidence showed
that anti-anxiety drugs affected responses to
conditioned aversive stimuli, the omission of
expected reward and conditioned frustration,
all of which Gray postulated were mediated by
a BIS, which was responsible for suppressing
ongoing operant behaviour in the face of
threat, as well as enhancing information 
processing and vigilance. (We shall see that
in this revised theory, these effects can be
reclassified as conflict effects.) Later, the
BAS was added to account for behavioural
reactions to rewarding stimuli – these were
largely unaffected by anti-anxiety drugs. The
danger of a circularity of argument was 
further reduced by the behavioural profile of
the newer classes of anxiolytics which, it
turned out, had the same behavioural effects
and acted on the same neural systems as the
older class of drugs, despite the fact that 
they had different psychopharmacological
modes of action and side-effects (Gray and
McNaughton, 2000).
Revised (2000–) RST
The Gray and McNaughton (2000) revised
theory updates and extends the ‘classic’
version. These changes are, in parts, substantial:
but, in other parts, more a clarification of the
1982 theory. Revised RST postulates three
systems.
1 The fight–flight–freeze system (FFFS) is responsi-
ble for mediating reactions to aversive stimuli of
all kinds, conditioned and unconditioned. It fur-
ther proposes that there exists a hierarchical
array of neural modules, responsible for avoid-
ance and escape behaviours. Now, the FFFS medi-
ates the emotion of fear, not anxiety. The
associated personality factor comprises fear-
proneness and avoidance, which is clinically
mapped onto such disorders as phobia and panic.
2 The BAS mediates reactions to all appetitive stim-
uli, conditioned and unconditioned. This system
generates the appetitively hopeful emotion of
‘anticipatory pleasure’, and hope itself. The asso-
ciated personality comprises optimism, reward-
orientation and impulsiveness, which clinically
maps onto addictive behaviours (e.g. pathologi-
cal gambling) and various varieties of high-risk,
impulsive behaviour, and possibly the appetitive
component of mania. The BAS is largely
unchanged in the revised Gray and McNaughton
version of RST.
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3 The BIS is responsible, not, as in the 1982 version,
for mediating reactions to conditioned aversive
stimuli and the special class of innate fear 
stimuli, but for the resolution of goal conflict in
general (e.g. between BAS-approach and FFFS-
avoidance, as in foraging situations – but it is
also involved in BAS–BAS and FFFS–FFFS conflicts).
The BIS generates the emotion of anxiety, which
entails the inhibition of prepotent conflicting
behaviours, the engagement of risk assessment
processes, and the scanning of memory and 
the environment to help resolve concurrent 
goal conflict.
The BIS resolves conflicts by increasing,
through recursive loops, the negative valence
of stimuli (these are adequate inputs into 
the FFFS), until behavioural resolution
occurs in favour of approach or avoidance.
Subjectively, this state is experienced as worry
and rumination. The associated personality
comprises worry-proneness and anxious
rumination, leading to being constantly on the
look-out for possible signs of danger, which
map clinically onto such conditions as gener-
alized anxiety and obsessional-compulsive
disorder (OCD). There is an optimal level of
BIS activation: too little leads to risk seeking
(e.g. psychopathy) and too much to risk 
aversion (generalized anxiety), both reflecting
suboptimal conflict resolution.
NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL STRUCTURE
OF THE REVISED THEORY
Revised RST agrees with the classical version
in its assertion that substantive affective
events fall into just two distinct major
classes: positive and negative (Gray, 1975;
Gray, 1982; Gray and McNaughton, 2000).
Rewards and punishments are the obvious
exemplars of positive and negative events,
respectively. But, importantly for human
experiments, the absence of an expected pos-
itive event is functionally the same as the
presence of a negative event and vice-versa
(Gray, 1975). Omission of expected reward is
thus punishing. Similarly, the absence of an
expected negative event is functionally the
same as the presence of a positive event.
Omission of punishment is rewarding. This
basic scheme gives rise to a two-dimensional
model of the neuropsychology of emotion,
motivation, and personality that simplifies the
theory, as well as serving as a point of unifi-
cation of the otherwise complex arrangement
of the separate neural modules underlying
behaviour (McNaughton and Corr, 2004).
Fear and anxiety – 
defensive direction
The first dimension, ‘defensive direction’, is
categorical. It rests on a functional distinction
between behaviours that remove an animal
from a source of danger (FFFS-mediated)
and those that allow it cautiously to approach
a source of potential danger (BIS-mediated).
These functions are ethologically and phar-
macologically distinct and, on each of these
separate grounds, can be identified with fear
and anxiety, respectively. The revised theory
treats fear and anxiety as not only quite 
distinct but also, in a sense, as opposites. 
The categorical separation of fear from 
anxiety as classes of defensive responses has
been demonstrated by Robert and Caroline
Blanchard (Blanchard and Blanchard, 1988,
1990; Blanchard et al., 1997).
The Blanchards used ‘ethoexperimental
analysis’ of the innate reactions of rats to cats
to determine the functions of specific classes
of behaviour. One class of behaviours was
elicited by the immediate presence of a pred-
ator. This class could clearly be attributed to
a state of fear. The behaviours, grouped into
the class on purely ethological grounds, were
sensitive to panicolytic drugs but not to 
drugs that are specifically anxiolytic. This is
consistent with the insensitivity to anxiolytic
drugs of active avoidance in a wide variety of
species, and phobia in humans is also insen-
sitive to anxiolytic drug treatment (Sartory 
et al., 1990). A second, quite distinct, class of
behaviours (including ‘risk assessment’) was
elicited by the potential presence of a predator.
244 THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF PERSONALITY THEORY AND ASSESSMENT
9781412946513-Ch11  4/18/08  12:49 PM  Page 244
This class of behaviours was sensitive 
to anxiolytic drugs. Both functionally and
pharmacologically, this class was distinct
from the behaviours attributed to fear and
could be attributed to a state of anxiety.
Fear and anxiety – 
defensive distance
The second dimension, ‘defensive distance’,
is graded: it rests on a functional hierarchy
that determines appropriate behaviour in
relation to defensive distance (i.e. perceived
distance from threat). This second dimension
applies equally to fear and anxiety but is
instantiated separately in each.
Defensive distance equates with real 
distance; but in a more dangerous situation,
the perceived defensive distance is shortened.
In other words, defensive behaviour (e.g. active
avoidance) will be elicited at a longer 
(objective) distance with a highly dangerous
stimulus (which shortens perceived defensive
distance), as compared to the elicitation of
defensive behaviour by a less dangerous
stimulus. According to the theory, certain
individuals have a much shorter perceived
defensive distance for a given threat stimulus,
and thus react more intensively to relatively
innocuous (in real distance terms) stimuli.
McNaughton and Corr (2004) view 
individual differences in defensive distance
for a fixed real distance as a reflection of 
the personality dimension underlying ‘pun-
ishment sensitivity’, or ‘threat perception’.
They suggest that the high pole of this
dimension is neurotic-introversion and the
low pole is stable-extraversion. This personal-
ity dimension affects the FFFS-mediated
behaviours directly, but affects those medi-
ated by the BIS only indirectly (e.g. via
FFFS-BAS goal conflict). Anxiolytic drugs
are argued to alter (internally perceived)
defensive distance relative to actual external
threat. They do not affect defensive behav-
iour directly, but rather operate to shift
behaviour along the defensive axis, 
often leading to the output of a different
behaviour (e.g. risk-assessment to pre-threat
behaviour).
An important conclusion of this theory,
which goes to show the subtlety of revised
RST, is the claim that the comparison of indi-
viduals on a single measure of performance
at only a single level of threat may produce
results that are difficult to interpret. For
example, for an objectively defined defensive
distance, one person may be in a state of
panic and so cease moving, while another
may actively avoid and so increase their
movement. That is, highly sensitive and
insensitive fearful individuals will show dif-
ferent behaviours at the same level of threat
(defined in objective terms), as indeed will
trait-identical individuals at different levels
of threat. Thus moving people along this axis
of defensive distance (by drugs or by experi-
mental means) will not simply affect the
strength or probability of a given behaviour,
but is expected to result in different behav-
iours (which, themselves, may be in opposi-
tion). As we can see, at the core of the revised
theory are ethological factors, relating specific
behaviours to specific threats and environ-
mental conditions.
Conflict
Revised RST defines anxiety in terms of
defensive approach. However, this notion
contains something more fundamental 
about anxiety, namely, conflict. An animal
approaches a threat only if there is some 
possibility of a positive outcome (e.g. food
when foraging in an unsafe field). But threats
are not the only sources of aversion and
avoidance encountered. In principle, approach–
approach and avoidance–avoidance conflicts
also involve activation of the same system
and have essentially the same effects as 
classic approach–avoidance. It turns out that
the conditioned stimuli to which the unrevised
version of the BIS was said to be sensitive
are, according to this formulation, specific
examples of conflict stimuli. Thus, the new
BIS theory reclassifies conditioned stimuli
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and expands the type of stimuli processed 
by the BIS. All of these now fall under the
common rubric of goal conflict. This refor-
mulation also helps tidy-up the rag-bag of
other eliciting stimuli of the BIS (i.e. innate
stimuli and high-intensity noise): in their
non-conflict form, they now belong with 
the FFFS.
NEURAL SYSTEMS OF 
FEAR AND ANXIETY
Revised RST combines a large number of
brain structures ranging from the prefrontal
cortex, at the highest level, to the periaque-
ductal grey, at the lowest level, assigning to
each structure: (a) a specific place in the
theory; (b) a specific fundamental class of
function; and (c) a specific class of mental
disorder (McNaughton and Corr, 2008).
Thus, the most fundamental change to the
old view of the BIS is that it is distributed
among a number of neural structures.
General architecture
The concepts of defensive direction and
defensive distance provide a two-dimensional
schema within which all defensive behaviours
can be described. The theory translates this
two-dimensional psychological schema into
a matching two-dimensional neurological
one. In particular, the categorical distinction
between defensive approach and defensive
avoidance is translated into two distinct 
parallel streams of neural structures; and 
the dimension of defensive distance is 
translated into the levels of a hierarchy of
structures within each of the parallel streams
(Figure 11.2).
The neural mapping of defensive distance
into the two hierarchies is rendered simple by
two architectural features. First, smaller
defensive distances map to more caudal, sub-
cortical neural structures while larger defen-
sive distances map to more rostral, cortical
neural structures with intermediate structures
arranged in caudo-rostral order in between.
Second, this mapping occurs in a symmetri-
cal fashion with matching structures located
within each of the parallel streams (this often
involves subdivisions, or nuclei, of the same
named area).
THE BEHAVIOURAL APPROACH
SYSTEM (BAS)
We now have an outline of the FFFS and the
matching components of the BIS. Revised
RST theory also has a central place for the
BAS. It must be borne in mind that, although
the BIS would be activated with the simulta-
neous activation of the FFFS and the BAS
(e.g. in the case of approach–avoidance 
conflict), it remains the case that the BAS 
is conceptually distinct from both the BIS
and the FFFS.
Neural organization of the BAS
There are tensions in attempts to map the
BAS onto brain systems and functions. As
with the BIS and the FFFS, the BAS can be
viewed as hierarchically organized. Gray
(Gray and McNaughton, 1996; Gray et al.,
1991) has described the BAS as having 
a ‘caudate’ component and an ‘accumbens’
component. However, he also made clear that
‘accumbens holds a list of subgoals making
up a given motor program and is able to
switch through the list in an appropriate
order, but to retrieve the specific content of
each step, it needs to call up the appropriate
subroutine by way of its connections to the
[caudate] system’ (Gray and McNaughton,
1996). Such caudate motor command 
subroutines are quite distinct from the 
affect-laden goals that are the subject of the
FFFS, BAS and BIS (Gray and McNaughton,
2000).
On the other hand, as with the FFFS, the
hierarchical organization of the BAS makes
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it difficult for any part of it to control overall
BAS sensitivity. Where a personality factor is
thought to alter such sensitivity generally, 
we should probably look for appropriate
modulatory systems. The neuromodulator
that is probably of primary importance in
BAS functioning is dopamine (DA; Depue
and Collins, 1999; Pickering and Gray,
1999). The accumbens and caudate separa-
tion, alluded to by Gray, is reflected in the 
distinction between the so-called mesolimbic
and nigrostriatal projection pathways of
dopaminergic cells (these project to accum-
bens and caudate respectively, along with
other structures). However, many influences
(e.g. genes), which could generate individual
differences in dopaminergic neurotransmission,
may well express their effects on more than
one dopaminergic projection system (Depue
and Collins, 1999). Moreover, the structures
innervated by these distinct dopaminergic
systems act cooperatively to deliver behav-
ioural responses thought of as being under
BAS control.
In the neuroscience literature, over the 
last 15 years or so, a strong consensus has
emerged over the functional significance of
firing of dopaminergic cells in the midbrain
J.A. GRAY’S REINFORCEMENT SENSITIVITY THEORY (RST) OF PERSONALITY 247
5HT
PREFRONTAL “GAD” -
DORSAL STREAM drug-resistant
POSTERIOR GAD -
CINGULATE cognition
SEPTO-HIPPO- GAD -
CAMPAL SYSTEM cognition
Defensive
approach:
Anxiety
AMYGDALA GAD -
arousal
PREFRONTAL - OCD
VENTRAL STREAM
ANTERIOR OCD
CINGULATE
AMYGDALA Phobia -
avoid
MEDIAL Phobia -
HYPOTHALAMUS escape
PERIAQUEDUCTAL Panic -
GRAY
explode/freeze
Defensive
avoidance:
Fear
AMYGDALA Phobia -
arousal
Personality traits
Leaving dangerous
situation
Entering dangerous
situation
Defensive direction
Defensive distance
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(Arbuthnott and Wickens, 2007; Schultz,
1998). The view is that DA cell firing reflects
a ‘reward prediction error’ (RPE) signal.
Specifically, in primates, increased bursts of
DA cell firing result when an unexpected
(under-predicted) reward occurs. Decreases
in DA cell firing are observed when an
expected reward does not occur (see Schultz,
1998, for details). Neuroimaging evidence in
humans has also emerged which is consistent
with this view (e.g. Abler et al., 2006). As
argued elsewhere (Pickering and Gray, 1999,
2001; Pickering and Smillie, 2008), a proper
neuroscientific understanding of the BAS
will need to incorporate this RPE conceptu-
alization of DA cell firing.
Of great interest in this area, the RPE view
of DA cell firing is consistent with classic
computational models of reinforcement
learning (e.g. Dayan and Abbott, 2001).
Learning in these models is hypothetically
controlled by an RPE signal: a positive RPE
(caused by an unexpected reward) is used to
strengthen learning in the neural pathways
which generated the behaviour leading to the
reward; a large negative RPE (caused by a
non-occurring expected reward) is used to
extinguish learning in the neural pathways
which generated the behaviour leading to the
reward. When the RPE is close to zero (i.e. the
level of reward is accurately predicted), then
little learning takes place. The observations
that DA cells fire in a fashion closely 
resembling an RPE signal was seen as 
providing a neural validation of these models.
Moreover, the dopaminergic projection path-
ways release dopamine at sites very close to
synapses on the dendritic spines of caudate
and accumbens cells; these synapses are at
the terminals of cortical inputs to the stria-
tum. This synaptic arrangement, and the den-
dritic spines themselves, have a number of
neurophysiological features (Wickens and
Kotter, 1995) which enables an incoming
burst of dopaminergic firing to operate 
effectively as a reinforcement/RPE signal
and control learning at those cortico-striatal
synapses.
The RPE conceptualization of dopamine
cell firing in projections to BAS structures
(caudate, accumbens, etc.) has strong 
resonances with the Gray and Smith (1969)
cybernetic model of the functional interactions
between the reward and punishment systems.
In this model, the reward system had a 
comparator within it which determined
whether the level of reward received matched
the level expected. It was proposed that the
results of this comparison process were fed
back appropriately as inputs to the reward
and punishment systems, although the
detailed way in which this controlled learn-
ing of responses was not specified. The RPE
account outlined above suggests how this
learning may be accomplished. The Gray and
Smith (1969) model proposed a general
framework for choosing between responses
leading to rewarding versus punishing behav-
ioural consequences. Recent theoretical
models of potential BAS structures in the
basal ganglia have formalized the way that
they may allow efficient decision-making of
this kind (for an overview and references, see
Bogacz, 2007).
Previously, accounts have been offered to
begin to incorporate the neuroscience of
dopamine cells and the basal ganglia into our
understanding of the BAS (Pickering and
Gray, 1999, 2001; see also Pickering and
Smillie, 2008). This research is proceeding
apace, and the final details have yet to be
worked out. A challenge will be able to find
an appropriate level of modelling which is
able to distinguish between alternative 
neurally based accounts of the BAS.
What personality trait is 
linked to the BAS?
What broad personality trait might correspond
to variations in the functioning of the BAS?
Gray’s original decision to call it ‘impulsivity’
was entirely ad hoc, as he repeatedly admit-
ted. He used the ancient circular model of the
humours (popularized by Eysenck) and drew
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a line between the types ‘anxious’ and 
‘carefree’ (being confident that the BIS 
subserved trait anxiety). The line at right
angles to the anxiety dimension (he assumed
the BAS and BIS traits were orthogonal)
approximately joins the labels of ‘impulsive’
and ‘thoughtful’ (although he might as easily
have chosen ‘optimistic’ and ‘careful’ on
these geometric grounds!). Thus, the impul-
sivity dimension was born; although Gray
also had to decide which way round to place
the dimension (high BAS types were
assigned to the impulsive end of the dimen-
sion, on grounds of plausibility). This deci-
sion was further reinforced by the two
components of extraversion in Eysenck’s
model, namely sociability and impulsivity, 
as well as experimental work showing impul-
sivity related to classical conditioning effects
(see above).
On a related matter, Corr (2008) has drawn
attention to the inadequate conceptualization
of the BAS, especially as it relates to impul-
sivity. On evolutionary grounds, the BAS
may be thought to be more complex than the
FFFS, or indeed the BIS. The primary func-
tion of the BAS is to move the animal up the
temporo-spatial gradient to the final biologi-
cal reinforcer. This primary function is sup-
ported by a number of secondary processes,
comprising perhaps simple approach, perhaps
with BIS activation exerting behavioural 
caution at critical points, designed to reduce
the distance between current and desired
appetitive state (e.g. as seen in foraging
behaviour in a densely vegetated field).
However, in human behaviour, this depiction
of BAS-controlled approach behaviour may
be oversimplified.
First, it is helpful to distinguish the incentive
motivation component and the consummatory
component of reactions to appetitive stimuli.
The neural machinery controlling reactions
to unconditioned (innate) stimuli, and its
associated emotion, must be different from
that controlling the behaviour and emotion
associated with approach, signalled by 
conditioned stimuli, to such stimuli. Thus, while
the BAS responds to all appetitive stimuli, it
is concerned specifically with the appetitive-
approach aspects that move the animals
towards the final biological reinforcer; at this
point, non-BAS consummatory mechanisms,
specific to the particular reinforcer con-
cerned, are activated, e.g., the eating of food.
Second, moving to approach proper, we
can discern a number of relatively separate,
albeit overlapping, processes. At the simplest
level, there seems an obvious difference
between the ‘interest’ and ‘drive’ that charac-
terizes the early stages of approach, and the
behavioural and emotional excitement as the
animal reaches the final biological reinforcer.
Emotion in the former case may be termed
‘anticipatory pleasure’ (or ‘hope’); in the
latter, ‘excitement’. There is evidence that, at
the psychometric level, the BAS is multidi-
mensional. For example, the Carver and
White (1994) BIS/BAS scales measure three
aspects of BAS: reward responsiveness,
drive, and fun-seeking. It may be speculated
that drive is concerned with actively pursing
desired goals, reward-responsiveness is con-
cerned with excitement at doing things well
and winning, and fun-seeking is concerned
with the impulsivity aspect of the BAS (which
is especially appropriate for the capture of
the final biological reinforcer).
Subgoal scaffolding
As discussed in detail by Corr (2008), BAS
behaviour may best be seen as involving 
a series of appetitively motivated subgoals.
That is, in order to move along the temporo-
spatial gradient to the final primary biologi-
cal reinforcer, it is necessary to engage in
subgoal scaffolding. This process has several
stages: (a) identification of the biological
reinforcer; (b) planning behaviour; and 
(c) executing the plan. Important in this regard
is the following: complex approach behaviour
entails a series of behavioural processes,
some of which oppose each other. For example,
behaviour restraint and planning are often
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demanded to achieve BAS goals, but not at
the final point of capture of the biological
reinforcer, where non-planning and fast reac-
tions (i.e. impulsivity) are more appropriate.
Being a highly impulsive person – that is,
acting fast without thinking and not planning
– would not be appropriate BAS behaviour in
anything other than very simple situations.
Indeed, such behaviour would often move
the animal away from their desired goal. For
this reason, and others mentioned above,
‘impulsivity’ is not the most appropriate term
for the personality factor corresponding to the
full range of processes entailed by the BAS.
Therefore, given such a weak basis for
Gray’s initial labelling of the BAS, as well its
apparent complexity, it is somewhat surprising
that the BAS has been equated with impul-
sivity for so long. The first serious contradic-
tory views came many years later. Depue and
Collins (1999) argued that extraversion (and in
particular its agentic aspects) better captured
the nature of the BAS-related personality
trait. Their argument drew on detailed support
from the animal neurophysiological literature
but was, in essence, a simple one. First, they
suggested that the BAS was closely linked to
dopaminergic neurotransmission. Second,
they argued that the extant evidence pointed
to a link between extraversion and dopamin-
ergic neurotransmission which was stronger
than the link for any other major personality
trait. We (Corr, 1999; Pickering, 1999;
Pickering and Gray, 1999) cautioned that the
evidential basis for part two of their argument
rested on a tiny body of data, mostly from
Depue and colleagues’ own laboratory. In
addition, we suggested that Depue and
Collins had ignored an equally small body 
of data which pointed to links between
dopaminergic neurotransmission and a 
cluster of traits we have termed impulsive
antisocial sensation seeking (ImpASS),
rather than extraversion. At that time we felt
that the jury could not reach as clear a verdict
as that reached by Depue and Collins and
argued that (aspects of) the ImpASS trait
cluster might correspond to the BAS trait.
Subsequent neuroscience data has emerged
that is broadly in line with Depue and Collins’
thesis (e.g. Cohen et al., 2005; Wacker et al.,
2006). However, there are also psychometric
and behavioural data (see Smillie et al., 2006,
for a review) which we feel now tip the scales
more strongly in favour of the idea that extra-
version might be the BAS trait. But, further
data are needed, especially ones relating spe-
cific psychometric measures of the revised
RST’s systems to extraversion.
INTERACTIONS OF THE BAS, FFFS,
AND BIS: IMPLICATIONS FOR TRAIT
MEASUREMENT
The old description of RST supposed that
each system had a reactivity/sensitivity to its
key inputs, which we can denote wA, wI, and
wF for the sensitivity of the BAS, BIS, and
FFFS, respectively. Interindividual variations
in wA, wI, and wF are assumed to follow a
normal distribution with each sensitivity
independent of (uncorrelated with) the
others. The trait of anxiety, Anx, was taken 
to reflect variation in wI and another trait
(‘the BAS trait’) was taken to reflect 
variation in wA.
Elsewhere we (Corr, 2002; Pickering,
1997) argued that the effects of such systems
on behaviour would generally not be 
independent of one another even though the
sensitivities were themselves independent –
although, under certain conditions, they
would (specified by Corr, 2002). Thus, for
example, a behaviour controlled by reward
reinforcers would not only be influenced by
the BAS personality trait (i.e. wA) but could
also often be influenced by Anx. Corr 
(2002) dubbed this the joint subsystems
hypothesis in contrast to an earlier view that
behaviour controlled by reward would
depend selectively upon wA (the separable
subsystems hypothesis).
Recently, Smillie et al. (2006) took this
view further. They argued that self-report
questionnaire responses, used to measure per-
sonality traits, are likely to reflect subjective
250 THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF PERSONALITY THEORY AND ASSESSMENT
9781412946513-Ch11  4/18/08  12:49 PM  Page 250
estimates of the functional outcomes rather
than latent properties of the individual neural
systems. A functional outcome of the BAS
might be its mean output level across a range
of situations, whereas a latent property
would be its sensitivity (wA). They suggested
that the functional outcome will be available
for introspection (and hence self-report)
whereas a sensitivity will not, although the
sensitivities will clearly have a direct influ-
ence on the observable functional outcome
(someone with a higher value of wA will, all
other things being equal, have a higher mean
BAS output level than a person with lower
wA). Looking at the item content of various
possible BAS personality trait measures,
Pickering (2008) concluded that such ques-
tionnaires might well reflect functional BAS
outcomes (such as mean output level).
This viewpoint leads to some potentially
striking conclusions. The functional outcomes
of each system are, as for other reinforcer-
controlled behaviours, likely to be susceptible
to the joint influences of the various interact-
ing systems. Smillie et al. (2006) report the
results of simulation studies which illustrate
this point. For one particular plausible set 
of interactions between the BIS, BAS and
FFFS (in line with the revised Gray and
McNaughton, 2000, model) they simulated
functional outcomes (in this case mean
output) across 200 randomly sampled and
widely varying combinations of reinforcers.
The mean BAS output across simulated 
individuals was predicted (R2 = 0.89) by the
following regression equation:
Mean BAS output =
(βA × wA) − (βF × wF) − (β I × w I)
where the βs are positive-valued regression
coefficients. The same model showed that
mean BIS output was predicted (R2 = 0.85) by:
(β ¢A × wA) + (β ¢F × wF) + (β ¢I × w I)
By contrast, it is interesting to note that the
mean FFFS output was predicted (R2 = 0.82)
only by the sensitivity of the FFFS.
Assuming some trait questionnaires do
reflect functional outcomes of specific sys-
tems then these simulations raise important 
and paradoxical results. For example, the
‘BAS-related’ trait measures is BAS-related
because it is defined by the functional 
outcome of the BAS and yet it is influenced
by the sensitivities of all three interacting
systems (wA, wF and wI). Thus, if one were to
develop a new BAS trait measure then one
should not consider it invalidated if it 
correlated negatively with anxiety (BIS trait)
measures; the simulations predict that such
trait correlations should be observed. These 
predictions occur, it is worth reiterating, even
though wA and wI (the underlying system
sensitivities) are independent of one another.
The description of the ‘reinforcement sensi-
tivity’ theory of personality has implied a
one-to-one mapping of traits (e.g. anxiety)
onto the sensitivities of single systems (e.g.
the BIS). The simulations show that this need
not be the case and trait measures may be
jointly determined by the sensitivities of all
three interacting systems. It remains sensible,
however, to talk of the theory as ‘reinforce-
ment sensitivity’ theory, as the resulting 
personality traits are determined by the 
sensitivities of reinforcement-dependent 
systems; however, the one-to-one mapping 
of traits onto sensitivities is now being 
questioned.
In a speculative footnote to this section,
we consider whether there might be some
trait measures which line up more directly
with underlying sensitivities rather than
functional outcomes? The simulations sug-
gested that, for traits related to FFFS 
functioning, the two bases (sensitivities,
functional outcomes) may sometimes be
more or less interchangeable. This fits well
with the account proposed by McNaughton
and Corr (2004, 2008) in which the trait of
fearfulness (neurotic-introversion to stable-
introversion) maps directly onto underlying
punishment sensitivity.
However, one might also imagine a situa-
tion in which a trait measure, T, had items
which reflected the functional outcome of one
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system along with other items which reflected
the functional outcome of another system (we
finesse here the question of whether such a
trait measure could ever emerge in a factor
analytic approach to trait measure develop-
ment). Imagine such a measure was based on
a mixture of BAS and BIS functional out-
comes. The final trait measure (from the
results of the simulations presented earlier)
would be given by a summation of the two
earlier regression equations:
T = (βA × wA) − (βF × wF) − (β I × wI) +
(β ¢A × wA) + (β ¢F × w F) + (β ¢I × w I)
Assuming the values of β I and β′I, and βF
and β′F, were broadly similar then the above
equation would approximately reduce to
T = (β A + β ¢A) × wA
In this scenario, the trait measure T would
directly reflect the sensitivity of a single
underlying system (the BAS in this 
example).
High scores on such a trait measure would
be found in people who had higher BAS
functional outcomes (e.g. higher mean BAS
outputs) and higher BIS functional outcomes
(e.g. higher mean BIS outputs) across a range
of situations. Is such a trait measure likely?
Do any existing trait measures plausibly satisfy
such conditions? We do not think this is
likely. It might be suggested that extraversion
questionnaires might be candidates for traits
like T above. The EPQ extraversion scale, for
example, has several items about enjoying
social situations (e.g. Do you enjoy meeting
new people? Would you enjoy yourself at a
lively party?); these can plausibly be viewed
by indexing mean BAS output in these 
contexts. However, under Gray and
McNaughton’s (2000) reformulation of RST,
and based on the description of the action of
the BIS, someone with a high mean BIS
output would often be rather cautious and
deliberate, tending to seek extra information
when situations are ambiguous or when
motivations are conflicting, and so on. Such
a person might be described as low impulsive
and deliberate. Items addressing these behav-
ioural aspects might be found on some extra-
version scales, and items addressing these
behaviours on other scales would be very
likely to correlate moderately with traditional
extraversion items. However the correlation
would be the opposite way round to that
required for a trait measure such as T above;
in our view, a trait measure like T therefore
seems very unlikely to exist.
In summary, the main message of this sec-
tion remains: the role of underlying rein-
forcement sensitivities in our revised
understanding of RST seems likely to be
more complex than has been hitherto sug-
gested. With the possible exception of the
punishment / fear system, variations in the
sensitivities of the underlying systems to
their characteristic inputs may not have 
one-to-one mappings onto observable per-
sonality traits.
PERSONALITY AND
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY
How does personality relate to psychological
conditions (e.g. anxiety). No doubt, the details
of RST shall continue to undergo continual
refinement and change – that is in the nature of
any scientific theory – but we believe that
‘defensive distance’ and ‘defensive direction’
shall continue to play a pivotal role as they
map onto a series of distinct neural modules, to
each of which can be attributed a particular
class of function, and so generation of a partic-
ular symptomatology (e.g. panic, phobia,
obsession). As noted by McNaughton and 
Corr (2004, 2008), these ‘symptoms’ may be
generated in several different ways:
1 as a normally adaptive reaction to specific (mild)
eliciting stimuli (e.g. mild anxiety just before an
exam);
2 as excessive activation of a related structure by
its specific (strong) eliciting stimuli, but where
the ‘symptoms’ are not excessive given the level
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of input from the related structure (e.g. panic
when crossing a railway line at the sight of 
a rapidly oncoming train);
3 at maladaptive intensity, as a result of excessive
sensitivity to their specific eliciting stimuli 
(e.g. fearful avoidance as a result of seeing a
harmless spider) – this would be a pathological
reaction.
In addition, pathologically excessive (BIS)
anxiety could generate (FFFS) panic with the
latter being entirely appropriate to the level
of apprehension experienced. Conversely,
pathological panic could, with repeated
experience, condition anxiety with the level
of the latter being appropriate to the panic
experienced. This modular view of the
defence system, separated into distinct 
syndrome and symptom-specific, components
was developed largely on the basis of animal
experiments. In addition, the linking of this
view to terms such as panic, phobia, and
obsession is also justified by the clinical
effects of drugs when taken together as a
class. (All drugs have common and unique
effects, and it is only their common effects
that interest us here.) RST may provide a sat-
isfactory explanation of the variety of clinical
‘neurotic’ phenomena observed, yet at the
same time, may appear to destroy the very
unity of an underlying personality trait.
However, this problem seems worse than it
is. For rescue, we need only appeal to the fact
that, based on quantitative genetic studies,
there is a common fundamental predisposi-
tion to the plethora of clinical neurotic condi-
tions observed, even though that
predisposition manifests differently in differ-
ent individuals (Kendler et al., 2003). Indeed,
the action of many clinically effective drugs
is best viewed as an interaction with more
global modulatory systems. For example,
5HT neurons innervate virtually the entire
defence system; and drugs such as
imipramine or specific serotonin reuptake
inhibitors (SSRIs), have a general effect on
5HT synapses. Such drugs affect anxiety,
depression and panic because they increase
the levels of 5HT in the different parts of 
the system controlling each.
Therefore, comparison of drug classes can
be used to dissect out different parts of the
defence system. But this comparison must
involve several different drugs within each
class if specific conclusions are to be drawn
about specific brain systems. Conversely, the
systems as a joint whole, and each system
individually, may be globally susceptible to
modulation controlled by the biological 
substrates underlying personality. In detail,
then, the system underlying clinical 
drug action consists of two sets of 
parallel, interconnected modules dealing
with defensive avoidance and defensive
approach, respectively. Superimposed 
on these specialized modules are general
modulatory systems.
It should be expected that if these modula-
tory systems are crucial for personality, there
is also a conceptual need for general control.
Certainly with the BIS, anxiolytics clearly
alter defensive distance: they alter at what-
ever point of the neural hierarchy is in control
given progressive variations in the external
situation, and they do so in a lawful manner.
Assuming that the control of fear by the
monoamines operates in a similar manner to
the control of anxiety by anxiolytic drugs, we
should expect the personality factor related
directly to ‘punishment sensitivity’ would be
the one that alters the internal defensive dis-
tance in relation to any particular real dis-
tance. Put another way, a personality factor
of fearfulness multiplies the quantum of fear
inherent in a particular stimulus, producing
many different levels (across different indi-
viduals) with the same stimulus.
CONCLUSIONS
There remains some considerable uncer-
tainty as the best way to relate fundamental
systems of emotion and motivation to per-
sonality factors, yet we contend that consid-
erable progress has already been made. This
chapter has illustrated that there is a lot 
of new theorizing which has substantially
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reformulated a popular theory of personality.
As yet, however, this new thinking has not
stimulated many new empirical findings. We
hope that this situation will change in the
near future. In relation to this issue, Smillie
et al. (2006: 320) note that although RST is
most often seen as a theory of anxiety and
impulsivity, it is ‘more accurately identified
as a neuropsychology of emotion, motivation
and learning. In fact, RST was born of basic
animal learning research, initially not at all
concerned with personality.’ They go on to
remark, ‘RST did not develop as a theory of
specific traits, but as a theory of specific bio-
logical systems which were later suggested
to relate, inter alia, to personality’ (2006: 321).
There is a related reason why basic emo-
tion and motivation systems do not map
neatly onto personality factors: basic emo-
tion and motivation theory has extended
beyond the point at which Gray suggested
that the BIS and BAS relate to anxiety and
impulsivity, respectively. Furthermore, RST
personality researchers have developed
scales to measure the BIS and BAS that were
influenced by Gray’s original thinking but
which do not reflect more recent develop-
ments in the basic theory. Thus, RST
research represents two distinct bodies of
knowledge, the first concerned with neural
systems and processes, the second with 
personality and its measurement. One of 
our purposes in writing this chapter is to
encourage other researchers to work to 
bring these two aspects into closer align-
ment. Nonetheless, the Janus-faced nature 
of RST has also been a strength, making 
it a dynamically evolving theory, but it 
also poses obvious problems for, at any 
given time, specifying a consensual model 
agreed by researchers.
REFERENCES
Abler, B., Walter, H., Erk, S., Kammerer, H. and
Spitzer, M. (2006) ‘Prediction error as a linear
function of reward probability is coded in
human nucleus accumbens’, NeuroImage,
31(2): 790–5.
Arbuthnott, G.W. and Wickens, J. (2007)
‘Space, time and dopamine’, Trends in
Neurosciences, 30(2): 62–9.
Blanchard, D.C. and Blanchard, R.J. (1988)
‘Ethoexperimental approaches to the biology
of emotion’, Annual Review of Psychology,
39: 43–68.
Blanchard, R.J. and Blanchard, D.C. (1990) 
‘An ethoexperimental analysis of defense,
fear and anxiety’, in N. McNaughton and 
G. Andrews (eds), Anxiety. Dunedin: Otago
University Press, pp. 12–133.
Blanchard, R.J., Griebel, G., Henrie, J.A. and
Blanchard, D.C. (1997) ‘Differentiation of
anxiolytic and panicolytic drugs by effects on
rat and mouse defense test batteries’,
Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews,
21(6): 783–9.
Bogacz, R. (2007) ‘Optimal decision-making
theories: Linking neurobiology with 
behaviour’, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 
11(3): 118–25.
Carver, C.S. and White, T.L. (1994) ‘Behavioral
inhibition, behavioral activation, and 
affective responses to impending reward 
and punishment: The BIS/BAS scales’,
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
67(2): 319–33.
Cohen, M.X., Young, J., Baek, J.M., Kessler, C.
and Ranganath, C. (2005) ‘Individual 
differences in extraversion and dopamine
genetics reflect reactivity of neural 
reward circuitry’, Cognitive Brain Research,
25(3): 851–61.
Corr, P.J. (1999) ‘Does extraversion predict 
positive incentive motivation?’, Behavioral
and Brain Sciences, 22(3): 520–1.
Corr, P.J. (2001) ‘Testing problems in J.A. 
Gray’s personality theory: A commentary on
Matthews and Gilliland (1999)’, Personal
Individual Differences, 30(2): 333–52.
Corr, P.J. (2002) ‘J.A. Gray’s reinforcement sen-
sitivity theory: Tests of the joint subsystem
hypothesis of anxiety and impulsivity’,
Personality and Individual Differences, 33(4):
511–32.
Corr, P.J. (2004) ‘Reinforcement sensitivity
theory and personality’, Neuroscience and
Biobehavioral Reviews, 28(3): 317–32.
Corr, P.J. (2008) ‘Reinforcement sensitivity
theory (RST): Introduction’, in P.J. Corr (ed.)
254 THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF PERSONALITY THEORY AND ASSESSMENT
9781412946513-Ch11  4/18/08  12:49 PM  Page 254
The Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory of
Personality. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, pp. 1–43.
Corr, P.J. and McNaughton, N. (2008).
‘Reinforcement sensitivity theory and person-
ality’, in P.J. Corr (ed.), The Reinforcement
Sensitivity Theory of Personality. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, pp. 155–87.
Dayan, P. and Abbott, L.F. (2001) Theoretical
Neuroscience: Computational and
Mathematical Modeling of Neural Systems.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Depue, R.A. and Collins, P.F. (1999)
‘Neurobiology of the structure of personality:
Dopamine, facilitation of incentive motivation,
and extraversion’, Behavioral and Brain
Sciences, 22(3): 491–517.
Eysenck, H.J. (1944) ‘Types of personality: 
A factorial study of 700 neurotics’, Journal of
Mental Science, 90: 859–61.
Eysenck, H.J. (1947) Dimensions of Personality.
London: K. Paul, Trench Trubner.
Eysenck, H.J. (1957) The Dynamics of Anxiety
and Hysteria. New York: Preger.
Eysenck, H.J. (1967) The Biological Basis of
Personality. Springfield, IL: Thomas.
Eysenck, H.J. (1979) ‘The conditioning model
of neurosis’, Behavioural and Brain Sciences,
2(2): 155–99.
Eysenck, H.J. and Eysenck, M.W. (1985)
Personality and Individual Differences: 
A Natural Science Approach. New York:
Plenum Press.
Eysenck, H.J. and Levey, A. (1972) ‘Conditioning,
introversion–extraversion and the strength 
of the nervous system’, in V.D. Nebylitsyn
and J.A. Gray (eds), The Biological Bases 
of Individual Behaviour. London: Academic
Press. pp. 206–20.
Gray, J.A. (1970) ‘The psychophysiological 
basis of introversion–extraversion’, Behaviour
Research and Therapy, 8(3): 249–66.
Gray, J.A. (1972a) ‘Learning theory, the 
conceptual nervous system and personality’,
in V.D. Nebylitsyn and J.A. Gray (eds), The
Biological Bases of Individual Behaviour. New
York: Academic Press. pp. 372–99
Gray, J.A. (1972b) ‘The psychophysiological nature
of introversion–extraversion: A modification
of Eysenck’s theory’, in V.D. Nebylitsyn and
J.A. Gray (eds), The Biological Bases of
Individual Behaviour. New York: Academic
Press. pp. 182–205.
Gray, J.A. (1975) Elements of a Two-Process
Theory of Learning. London: Academic Press.
Gray, J.A. (1976) ‘The behavioural inhibition
system: A possible substrate for anxiety’, 
in M.P. Feldman and A.M. Broadhurst 
(eds), Theoretical and Experimental Bases 
of Behaviour Modification. London: Wiley.
pp. 3–41.
Gray, J.A. (1981) ‘A critique of Eysenck’s 
theory of personality’, in H.J. Eysenck (ed.), 
A Model for Personality. Berlin: Springer. 
pp. 246–76.
Gray, J.A. (1982) The Neuropsychology of
Anxiety: An Enquiry into the Functions of the
Septo-Hippocampal System. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Gray, J.A., Feldon, J., Rawlins, J.N.P., Hemsley,
D.R. and Smith, A.D. (1991) ‘The neuropsy-
chology of schizophrenia’, Behavioral and
Brain Sciences, 14(1): 1–84.
Gray, J.A. and McNaughton, N. (1996) ‘The
neuropsychology of anxiety: Reprise’, in D.A.
Hope (ed.), Perspectives on Anxiety, Panic
and Fear. Nebraska: University of Nebraska
Press. pp. 61–134.
Gray, J.A. and McNaughton, N. (2000) The
Neuropsychology of Anxiety: An Enquiry into
the Functions of the Septo-Hippocampal
System. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gray, J.A. and Smith, P.T. (1969) ‘An arousal
decision model for partial reinforcement 
and discrimination learning’, in R.M. Gilbert
and N.S. Sutherland (eds), Animal
Discrimination Learning. London: Academic
Press. pp. 243–72.
Hebb, D.O. (1955) ‘Drives and the C.N.S.
(Conceptual Nervous System)’, Psychological
Review, 62(4): 243–54.
Kendler, K.S., Prescott, C.A., Myers, J. and
Neale, M.C. (2003) ‘The structure of genetic
and environmental risk factors for common
psychiatric and substance use disorders in
men and women’, Archives of General
Psychiatry, 60(9): 929–37.
McNaughton, N. and Corr, P.J. (2004). ‘A two-
dimensional neuropsychology of defense:
Fear/anxiety and defensive distance’,
Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews,
28(3): 285–305.
McNaughton, N. and Corr, P.J. (2008). ‘The
neuropsychology of fear and anxiety: A
foundation for reinforcement sensitivity
theory’, in P.J. Corr (ed.), The Reinforcement
J.A. GRAY’S REINFORCEMENT SENSITIVITY THEORY (RST) OF PERSONALITY 255
9781412946513-Ch11  4/18/08  12:49 PM  Page 255
Sensitivity Theory of Personality. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, pp. 44–94.
Pavlov, I.P. (1927) Reflexes: An Investigation of
the Physiological Activity of the Cerebral
Cortex. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
(Translated and edited by G.V. Anrep.)
Pickering, A.D. (1997) ‘The conceptual nervous
system and personality: From Pavlov to neural
networks’, European Psychologist, 2(2):
139–63.
Pickering, A.D. (1999) ‘Personality correlates of
the dopaminergic facilitation of incentive
motivation: Impulsive sensation seeking
rather than extraversion?’, Behavioural and
Brain Sciences, 22(3): 534–5.
Pickering, A.D. (2008) ‘Formal and computa-
tional models of reinforcement sensitivity
theory’, in P.J. Corr (ed.), The Reinforcement
Sensitivity Theory of Personality. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, pp. 453–81.
Pickering, A.D., Corr, P.J. and Gray, J.A. (1999)
‘Interactions and reinforcement sensitivity
theory: A theoretical analysis of Rusting and
Larsen (1997)’, Personality and Individual
Differences, 26(2): 357–65.
Pickering, A.D. and Gray, J.A. (1999) ‘The 
neuroscience of personality’, in L. Pervin and
O. John (eds), Handbook of Personality
(2nd edition). New York: Guilford Press. 
pp. 277–99.
Pickering, A.D. and Gray, J.A. (2001) 
‘Dopamine, appetitive reinforcement, and 
the neuropsychology of human learning: 
An individual differences approach’, in A. Eliasz
and A. Angleitner (eds), Advances in Individual
Differences Research. Lengerich, Germany:
PABST Science Publishers. pp. 113–49
Pickering, A.D. and Smillie, L.D. (2008) ‘The
behavioural activation system: Challenges
and opportunities’, in P.J. Corr (ed.), The
Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory of Personality.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.
120–54.
Sartory, G., MacDonald, R. and Gray, J.A.
(1990) ‘Effects of diazepam on approach,
self-reported fear and psychophysological
responses in snake phobics’, Behaviour
Research and Therapy, 28(4): 273–82.
Schultz, W. (1998) ‘Predictive reward 
signal of dopamine neurons’, Journal of
Neurophysiology, 80(1): 1–27.
Smillie, L.D., Pickering, A.D. and Jackson, C.J.
(2006) ‘The new reinforcement sensitivity
theory: Implications for personality measure-
ment’, Personality and Social Psychology
Review, 10(4): 320–35.
Wacker, J., Chavanon, M. and Stemmler, G.
(2006) ‘Investigating the dopaminergic basis
of extraversion in humans: A multilevel
approach’, Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 91(1): 171–87.
Wickens, J. and Kotter, R. (1995) ‘Cellular
models of reinforcement’, in J.C. Houk, J.L.
Davis and D.G. Beiser (eds), Models of
Information Processing in the Basal Ganglia.
London: MIT Press, pp. 189–214.
256 THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF PERSONALITY THEORY AND ASSESSMENT
9781412946513-Ch11  4/18/08  12:49 PM  Page 256
